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Certified Cases Under the Statutes
and the Rules of Civil Procedure*
JuDoE FRANK C. HAYMOND**
To those of us who for many years have had the advantage
of appellate review by the supreme court of appeals of certified
questions, it is difficult to realize that during the first half century
of the existence of our state there was no provision for an inde-
pendent appellate review of such questions. During that period of
time no appellate review could be had of an interlocutory order
overruling or sustaining a demurrer to any pleading in an action at
law or a suit in equity until the entry of a final judgment or decree.
Such an order, being interlocutory and not final in character and
not having been made appealable by any of the original provisions
of the statute governing appeals and writs of error to the supreme
court of appeals,' could not be made the basis of appellate review.
In consequence, if the trial court erroneously overruled a demurrer
to a declaration or a bill of complaint and rendered judgment for
the plaintiff on the merits, a correct decision upon the demurrer
which would have prevented the expense and the delay of a trial
of the case on the merits, could not be had until after a final or
appealable judgment had been rendered in the case.
Typical of the cases in which upon appellate review of a final
judgment on the merits the judgment was reversed and the case
remanded with directions to sustain a demurrer to the declaration
or the bill of complaint with leave to amend or to dismiss the case
*This paper was originally delivered at the Annual Meeting of the
West Virginia Bar Association, White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, August
31, 1962.
** Judge, West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
'W. VA. CODE, ch. 135, § 1 (Bame's 1923).
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are Atkins v. Guyandotte Timber Co.,2 and Shuttleworth v. Shuttle-
worth.' These cases were selected at random, but the West Virginia
Reports of decisions prior to 1915 are well supplied with cases in
which final rulings upon demurrers to pleadings were rendered by
the supreme court of appeals only upon appeals from or writs of
error to final or appealable judgments.
On February 20, 1915, the Legislature, at its 1915 Regular
Session, enacted Chapter 69 which added provisions which con-
ferred upon the supreme court of appeals jurisdiction to decide
questions certified to it by a trial court involving the sufficiency of
a summons, or a return of service, or challenge of the sufficiency
of a pleading in any case within the appellate jurisdiction of the
supreme court of appeals. The jurisdiction so conferred was ex-
pressly limited to the particular types of questions specifically men-
tioned in the statute. This statute, which became effective May 21,
1915, as subsequently amended, now appears as section 2, article 5,
chapter 58, Code, 1931, and to the extent here pertinent contains
these provisions:
"Any question arising upon the sufficiency of a sum-
mons or return of service, or challenge of the sufficiency
of a pleading, in any case within the appellate jurisdiction
of the supreme court of appeals, may, in the discretion of
the circuit court in which it arises, and shall, on the joint
application of the parties to the suit, in beneficial interest,
be certified by it to the supreme court of appeals for its
decision, and further proceedings in the case stayed until
such question shall have been decided and the decision
thereof certified back. The forms of the certificates of
such questions, as well as the time and the manner of the
hearing and notice thereof and the portion of the record
to be sent up, shall be as prescribed by the supreme court
of appeals."
It is also difficult to appreciate fully the far-reaching effect of the
statute with respect to certain phases of appellate procedure. I
think I understand its worth and importance for, as one of the old
timers, I was admitted to practice about three years before its
enactment.
2 70 W. Va. 99, 73 S.E. 243 (1911).
1 34 W. Va. 17, 11 S.E. 714 (1890).
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This statute is unique in that it expressly limits the jurisdiction
of the supreme court of appeals on appellate review of interlocutory
orders upon certificate to questions arising upon the sufficiency of
a summons, a return of service, and challenge to the sufficiency of
a pleading. Though a number of states, among them Alabama,
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana,
Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington and Wyoming, by con-
stitutional or statutory provisions authorize reservation, certification,
or report of cases or questions for or to an appellate court, in par-
ticularly designated circumstances, by courts of original jurisdiction
or by intermediate appellate courts,4 I have not found any exact
counterpart to section two among constitutions or statutes of any
other state and there is no statute in Virginia which provides ap-
pellate review upon certification of a question by a trial court.
A statute similar to section two, providing appellate review
by the circuit court upon certificate of any question arising in a
court of limited jurisdiction, upon the sufficiency of a summons,
or a return of service, or challenge of the sufficiency of a pleading,
was incorporated in the Code of 1931, as section 2, article 4, chapter
58. Prior to the enactment of that statute the supreme court of
appeals held in at least two cases. State v. Houchins5 and Atkinson
v. Empire Say. & Loan Co.,6 that a court of limited jurisdiction
could not certify questions arising in cases pending before it to the
supreme court of appeals or to a circuit court under the 1915 act.
Inasmuch as Rule 81(a) (1) of the new Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure provides that those rules do not apply to any case which
comes before a circuit court upon appeal from or to review the
judgment, order, or ruling of any court of record or administrative
agency, I shall refrain from further discussion of the appellate re-
view by the circuit court of cases certified to it by a court of limited
jurisdiction, except to mention the recent case of State v. Miller.7
In that case a criminal court of limited jurisdiction overruled a
demurrer to each of two counts of an indictment. On certificate to
the circuit court the ruling of the criminal court was reversed and
the demurrer sustained. Upon certificate the supreme court of ap-
4 4 C..S., Appeal and Error § 390.
5 96 W. Va. 375, 123 S.E. 185 (1924).6 108 W. Va. 425, 151 S.E. 173 (1929).
7 145 W. Va. 59, 112 S.E.2d 472 (1960).
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peals held that the questions were reviewable by it upon certificate
because the demurrer had been overruled by the trial court and re-
versed its ruling as to one count and affirmed its ruling as to the
other counts of the indictment.
The procedure concerning cases certified by the circuit court
is, as provided by the statute, governed by the Rules of Practice
in the Supreme Court of Appeals. The rules which specifically
apply to certified cases are Rule II, sections 4, 5, 6, and 7, Rule V,
sections 2 and 7, and Rule VI, section 9.
Rule H, section 4, provides that no question shall be certified
under section 2, article 5, chapter 58, Code, until after decision
of the question by the trial court and that the decision shall be
certified with the question; that all motions to docket certified cases
shall be presented and filed in the office of the clerk within sixty
days of the date of the order of certification; that no question once
certified shall be included in a subsequent order of certification in
the same case; and that motions to docket certified cases which
do not comply with this rule will not be considered.
It should perhaps be observed that notwithstanding the pro-
vision forbidding subsequent certification of the same question in
the same case, the refusal of the court to consider a question certified,
though amounting to affirmance of the ruling of the trial court,
does not constitute a final adjudication of the question involved.8
Rule H, section 5, prescribes the form of certificate in con-
nection with all questions covered by the statute. It is short and
concise and should be familiar to every member of the bar.
Rule H, section 6, requires the clerk to prepare a transcript
of so much of the record as is necessary for a determination of the
question certified, and provides that the certificate be placed at the
front of the transcript.
Rule II, section 7, directs that counsel on each side of the
case shall file one typewritten copy of a memorandum of authorities
when the case. is presented to the court.
Rule Y, section 2,-provides that all certified cases docketed
more than thirty days before the commencement of a regular term of
court, shall be placed on the argument docket for that term.
8 Hastings v. Finney, 119 W. Va. 301, 193 S.E. 444 (1937); Sweeney v.
Security Trust Co., 116 W. Va. 344, 180 S.E. 897 (1935).
[ Vol. 65
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Rule V, section 7, states that the record in certified cases need
not be printed unless ordered by the court, and that without further
notice all such cases docketed for hearing will be called at the
next term for which they are docketed.
Rule VI, section 9, provides that all certified cases docketed
for hearing shall be submitted on typewritten or printed briefs with-
out a formal request to submit, and that the party against whom
the ruling of the circuit court stands shall be regarded as the ap-
pellant or plaintiff in error in the supreme court of appeals for
the purpose of filing briefs and making oral arguments in the case.
In practice, under this rule, the court usually permits the submission
of certified cases on typewritten briefs.
If the members of the bar will thoroughly familiarize themselves
with these few short and simple rules, they will encounter no dif-
ficulty in the presentation and submission of certified cases in the
supreme court of appeals.
After the enactment of the original statute in 1915, the members
of the bar of this state were quick to take advantage of the method
of appellate review afforded by the new legislation. Within less than
six months after the statute became effective cases were certified to
the supreme court of appeals. The first such case to reach that
court was County Court of Hancock County v. Wilkin, from the
circuit court of that county, and was decided by order and without
opinion, September 14, 1915. In that case the sufficiency of a
notice of motion for judgment and a plea filed by the defendant
were involved. The appellate court sustained the circuit court in
overruling a motion to quash the notice and reversed that court in
rejecting the plea of the defendant.
Several of the earliest certified cases, numbered 1 to 23, were
decided by orders without opinions and for that reason they are not
recorded in the West Virginia Reports. The first certified cases
in which opinions were prepared and filed are Certified Case No. 24,
Marshall v. Anderson,9 decided April 17, 1917, and Certified Case
No. 25, Johnson v. City of HIYuntington)" decided -April 3, -1917.
- Since the enactment of the statute in 1915, at least 863 cases
have been docketed and reviewed by the supreme court of appeals
9 80 W. Va. 228, 92 S.E. 421 (1917).10 80 W. Va. 178, 92 S.E. 344 (1917).
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on certificate." During the forty-seven years since the enactment
of the original statute an average of approximately eighteen cases
a year certified by the circuit courts have been docketed and dis-
posed of by the supreme court of appeals. From the beginning
each certified case has been given a number which is entered in
the records of the supreme court of appeals; but many of the earlier
cases, though appearing in the reports of the decided cases, do not
carry a published number. During the past several years, however,
and since the decision in April 1925 of Harrison Const. Co. v.
Greystone Hotel Co.,' 2 Certified Case No. 346, each of the reported
certified cases bears a particular number which is listed in the
official case reports.
The statute authorizing the supreme court of appeals to decide
questions certified to it by a circuit court is one of the most important
statutes relating to appellate procedure when considered from the
standpoint of its availability during the early stages of a judicial
proceeding; and the general purpose of the Legislature in enacting it
was to enable the appellate court to determine upon certificate all
questions involving the sufficiency of a summons, a return of service,
or a pleading which affect or control the final disposition of a case
before vexatious costs are incurred or needless delays are encount-
ered in its ultimate and complete determination.'3 It was intended
to operate as an aid to the prompt and economical administration
of justice; and its purpose in that respect has in large measure been
realized.
The method of reaching the supreme court of appeals is, as
already indicated, appellate in character. 4 Judicial action is required
in the first instance in the trial court, which must decide the ques-
tions raised and record its action. The order recording the decision
is interlocutory but it is generally of such vital importance in the
final disposition of the case that it is imperative in the proper ad-
ministration of justice that its correctness be promptly verified or
denied by the court of last resort before the occurrence of unneces-
11 The most recent such case was Consolidation Coal Co. v. Mineral
Coal Co., 126 S.E.2d 194 (W. Va. 1962).
12 99 W. Va. 5, 127 S.E. 641 (1925).
'3West Virginia Water Serv. Co. v. Cunningham, 143 W. Va. 1, 98
S.E.2d 891 (1957); Weatherford v. Arter, 135 W. Va. 391, 63 S.E.2d 572(1951); 3 MIcmn's JURISPRUDENCE, Case Certified § 3.
14State v. Houchins, 96 W. Va. 375, 123 S.E. 185 (1924); 3 MiciM's
JURISPRUDENCE, Case Certified § 4.
[ Vol. 65
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sary costs and delays.' 5 The statutory procedure of presenting inter-
locutory decisions of a lower court to the appellate court upon
certificate, being in derogation of the common law, will be strictly
adhered to and followed."6
As already pointed out, the jurisdiction of the supreme court of
appeals is expressly limited to questions of law arising solely upon the
face of a summons, a return of service, or a pleading."l Matters
relating to mere procedure in the trial court are not certifiable and
an order, either interlocutory or final, granting or denying relief to
any party, can not be reviewed upon certificate.'6 Although the
statute permits rulings upon doubtful questions arising upon the
sufficiency of pleadings to be certified for review, it is necessary
that there be a prior unequivocal ruling by the circuit court before
the question can be certified.'9 Only such questions as have been
decided by the trial court and by it certified to the appellate court
may be considered upon certificate by that court.2" Thus, where, in
an action at law the circuit court sustains a motion to dismiss one
of the defendants, but later, during the same term of court, sets
aside the dismissal order and enters no other order except to certify
the question which arose upon the motion to dismiss, there has
been no prior decision of the question involved and the appellate
court will not pass upon the question presented by the certificate.2 '
The appellate court will not consider certified questions which
are not necessary in the decision of the case;" and it will confine
its ruling to the specific question certified.2 Under the statute the
contents of a stipulation by the parties may not be considered;24
Is ibid.
6 State v. DeSpain, 139 W. Va. 854, 81 S.E.2d 914 (1954).
'7Tyler v. Wetzel, 85 W. Va. 378, 101 S.E. 726 (1920); Jones v. Main
Island Creek Coal Co., 82 W. Va. 506, 96 S.E. 797 (1918); 3 Micm's
JuRisPRuDENcE, Case Certified § 5.
'
8 Tyler v. Wetzel, 85 W. Va. 378, 101 S.E. 726 (1920); 3 Micmr's
JURIspRUDENcE, Case Certified § 5.
19 Pancake Realty Co. v. Harber, 137 W. Va. 605, 73 S.E.2d 438 (1952);
Weatherford v. Arter, 135 W. Va. 391, 63 S.E.2d 572 (1951); County Court
of Raleigh County v. Cottle, 82 W. Va. 743, 97 S.E. 292 (1918).2 0 Means v. Kidd, 136 W. Va. 514, 67 S.E.2d 740 (1951).
21 Posten v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 93 W. Va. 612, 117 S.E. 491 (1923).22 West Virginia Water Serv. Co. v. Cunningham, 143 W. Va. 1, 98 S.E.2d
891 (1957).
23 Brumfield v. Wofford, 143 W. Va. 332, 102 S.E.2d 103 (1958).2 4 Carper v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 123 W. Va. 177, 13 S.E.2d 643
(1941).
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and the supreme court of appeals has no jurisdiction to determine a
question of fact upon certificate. 5
A judgment which involves a question arising upon a challenge
of the sufficiency of a pleading and is not appealable presents a
proper question for review by the appellate court upon certificate;
2 6
but appealable judgments, orders, or decrees are not reviewable
upon certificate.27
In City Ice & Fuel Co. v. Dankmer,2 8 in which the court held
that an order quashing a writ of scire facias to revive a chancery
cause is an appealable order and as such is not reviewable upon
certificate, the opinion contains these statements:
"Since questions appealable or reviewable by writ of
error are not regarded as questions upon which the lower
court could hold its ruling in abeyance pending the decision
of questions certified to a superior court, we have con-
sistently held that questions thus disposed of lack the tenta-
tive element necessary to certification. In such matters,
the lower court has taken a positive position."29
Likewise the action of a trial court in overruling a motion to quash
a search warrant is not certifiable to the appellate court inasmuch
as such warrant is not a summons, a return of service, or a pleading
within the meaning of the statute.3" As a bill of particulars is not
a pleading, a motion to quash it is not a challenge to the sufficiency
of a pleading, and the ruling of the trial court upon such motion
is not reviewable upon certificate.3 ' The supreme court of appeals
is without jurisdiction to review upon certificate the ruling of the
circuit court upon the sufficiency of an affidavit for interpleader
filed by a defendant in an action in assumpsit3 2 An order quashing
an attachment in a suit in equity can be reviewed by the supreme
25State v. Stout, 142 W. Va. 182, 95 S.E.2d 639, 59 A.L.R.2d 1154
(1956).26 Staud v. Sill, 114 W. Va. 208, 171 S.E. 428 (1933).2 7 City Ice & Fuel Co. v. Dankmer, 125 W. Va. 299, 24 S.E.2d 89 (1943);
Slater v. Slater," 118 W. Va. 645, 191 S.E. 524 (1932); Saffel v. Woodyard,
90 W. Va. 747, Ill S.E. 768 (1922).28 125 W. Va. 299, 24 S.E.2d 89 (1943).
29Id. at 300, 24 S.E.2d at 89, citing Slater v. Slater, 118 W. Va. 645,
191 S.E. 524 (1937).3 0 State v. DeSpain, 139 W. Va. 854, 81 S.E.2d 914 (1954).
31 Adkins v. Wayne County Court, 94 W. Va. 460, 119 S.E. 284 (1923).
32 Burlew Hardware Co. v. City of Spencer, 99 W. Va. 44, 127 S.E.
727 (1925).
[ Vol. 65
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court of appeals only upon appeal and is not reviewable by that
court upon certificate.33
Though an order of a trial court overruling a demurrer to an
indictment in a criminal case may be reviewed upon certificate
by the supreme court of appeals,34 the judgment of a circuit court
sustaining a demurrer to an indictment or to a warrant in a criminal
case before the court on appeal, and quashing the indictment or
the warrant because insufficient, is a final judgment and can not
be certified for review.3" Rulings by the lower court upon excep-
tions to answers to interrogatories appended to a bill in equity do
not raise a question of the sufficiency of a pleading and are not
reviewable upon certificate.36 The supreme court of appeals will
not consider upon certificate the ruling of the circuit court upon
the sufficiency of a petition to suppress evidence in a criminal case."7
A decree, to be appealable and not reviewable upon certificate,
must be an adjudication of not only a part, but of all, the principles
of the case.38 It should be observed, however, that it was previously
held in Blue v. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 9 that an order striking out
a part of a bill of complaint which was so material as to deny the
plaintiff a part only of the relief sought was a decree adjudicating
the principles of the cause and as such an appealable decree, and
that such order was not reviewable upon certificate, even though
it failed to dispose of the remaining part of the principles of the
cause.4" This holding, however, was expressly overruled in the later
case of Staud v. Sill,4' which held that a decree of that character
is not an appealable decree and is reviewable upon certificate. A
decree for alimony pendente lite in an amount equal to the juris-
dictional amount for an appeal to the supreme court of appeals,
being a decree for the payment of money, is an appealable decree
and can not be reviewed upon certificate. 2
"Marks v. Mitchell, 90 W. Va. 702, 111 S.E. 763 (1922); State ex rel
Trent v. Pritt, 134 W. Va. 516, 59 S.E.2d 890 (1950).
34 State v. Morrison, 96 W. Va. 674, 123 S.E. 678 (1924).
15 State v. O'Brien, 102 W. Va. 83, 134 S.E. 464 (1926).
36 County Court of Raleigh County v. Cottle, 82 W. Va. 743, 97 S.E.
292 (1918); 3 MicmE's JURISPRUDENCE, Case Certified § 10.
17 State v. Wantropski, 98 W. Va. 123, 126 S.E. 496 (1925); 3 MxcMaM's
JURISPRUDENCE, Case Certified § 13.
38 Staud v. Sill, 114 W. Va. 208, 171 S.E. 428 (1933).
39 93 W. Va. 717, 117 S.E. 612 (1923).40Blue v. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 93 W. Va. 717, 117 S.E. 612 (1923).
41 114 W. Va. 208, 171 S.E. 428 (1933).
42 Slater v. Slater, 118 W. Va. 645, 191 S.E. 524 (1937).
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The only question that may be properly certified to the supreme
court of appeals for review arising upon a general demurrer to a
declaration when such demurrer has been sustained or overruled
is whether the declaration states a good cause of action against the
defendant." A decree sustaining a demurrer to a part of a bill
and dismissing it as to such part, being neither final nor appealable,
but, nevertheless, dispositive of a question involving the sufficiency
of a pleading is reviewable upon certificate." A ruling on a motion
to quash a summons can not be certified for review." A petition or
motion to appoint or remove church trustees, not being a pleading
within the meaning of the statute, can not be reviewed upon
certificate.
46
The appellate court has no jurisdiction to consider upon cer-
tificate the sufficiency of any pleading which it is necessary to dispose
of by proof."' In a recent case, State v. Miller," the opinion states
that when a pleading is disposed of by proof the questions presented
may not be certified and that certification may be had only when
a demurrer testing the sufficiency of a pleading is filed and no proof
is taken."9 Likewise the sufficiency of a bill for an injunction to
which no plea putting that question in issue has been filed can not
be certified to the appellate court upon the order awarding a tem-
porary injunction." When the principles of a cause have been ad-
judicated the appellate court is without jurisdiction to review upon
certificate the ruling of the trial court upon a demurrer which has
been filed in the case."
Where a circuit court, on an issue of fact joined on a plea in
abatement denying jurisdiction, decides the issue and renders final
judgment, the questions involved may not be reviewed upon cer-
tificate. 2 The supreme court of appeals has repeatedly held that
4 Brumfield v. Wofford, 143 W. Va. 332, 102 S.E.2d 103 (1958);
Clayton v. County Court of Roane County, 96 W. Va. 333, 123 S.E. 189(1924).
44 Gulland v. Gulland, 81 W. Va. 487, 94 S.E. 943 (1918).
1 Tyler v. Wetzel, 85 W. Va. 378, 101 S.E. 726 (1920); Nicola v.
Williams, 103 W. Va. 29, 136 S.E. 512 (1927).
46 Wilsonburg Methodist Episcopal Church v. Ash, 87 W. Va. 668, 105
S.E. 915 (1921).47 Sage v. Boyd, 145 W. Va. 197, 113 S.E.2d 836 (1960).
48 145 W. Va. 59, 112 S.E.2d 472 (1960).
41State v. Holesapple, 116 W. Va. 19, 178 S.E. 280 (1935).
1o City of Wheeling v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 81 W. Va. 438,
94 S.E. 511 (1917).
11 Central Trust Co. v. Green, 98 W. Va. 200, 127 S.E. 32 (1925).
"
2Jones v. Main Island Creek Coal Co., 82 W. Va. 506, 96 S.E. 797(1918).
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when a demurrer to a declaration or a bill of complaint has been
sustained and the action has been dismissed, the appellate court
can not upon certificate review the action of the trial court, and that
the order of dismissal, being a final judgment, can be reviewed only
upon writ of error or appeal.53 In Heater v. Lloyd the court used
this pertinent language concerning the statute governing certified
cases:
"The effect of the provisions of that statute is to
circumscribe, restrict and limit the right of this court to
entertain and decide only questions immediately arising in
the preliminary stages of a controversy, that is, mere inter-
locutory orders, not those fully and completely terminating
the action or suit by final judgment or decree. To obtain
relief from an erroneous judgment or decree the party ag-
grieved must resort to the usual writs provided by law
for that purpose, and not to those provided for a special
purpose." 54
A statement in writing, filed by plaintiff in an action upon an
insurance policy, may be challenged by a demurrer by the defendant,
and the question arising upon the demurrer may be reviewed upon
certificate."5 The typical case which regularly comes before the
supreme court of appeals in which the questions presented are prop-
erly reviewable upon certificate is that in which the circuit court
overrules a demurrer to a complaint or a plea, or sustains a demurrer
to a complaint, or a plea, but does not dismiss the action, and
certifies the ruling to the appellate court.
I have referred to many West Virginia decisions under the
certification statute in what I fear may be tedious or boresome detail.
This I have done to present for your benefit most of the matters
dealt with by the court and for the added reason that the test pre-
scribed for determining whether a question is reviewable upon
certificate before the Rules of Civil Procedure became effective on
July 1, 1960, will apply with controlling force and effect in determin-
53Lee v. City of Elkins, 97 W. Va. 183, 124 S.E. 499 (1924); State v.
Crockett, 94 W. Va. 423, 119 S.E. 165 (1923); Blue v. Hazel-Atlas Glass
Co., 93 W. Va. 717, 117 S.E. 612 (1923); Saffel v. Woodyard, 90 W. Va.
747, 111 S.E. 768 (1922); Pittsburgh & West Virginia Gas Co. v. Shreve,
90 W. Va. 277, 110 S.E. 714 (1922); Heater v. Lloyd, 85 W. Va. 570,
102 S.E. 228 (1920).
1 85 W. Va. 570, 573, 102 S.E. 228 (1920).
" Crouch v. Franklin Natl. Ins. Co., 104 W. Va. 605, 140 S.E. 681
(1927).
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ing whether questions governed by those rules are reviewable by
the supreme court of appeals upon certificate.
Contrary to an erroneous impression which I have been told
prevails among some members of the bar in some of the judicial
circuits in this state, the considerable benefits and advantages af-
forded by the certification statute, to which I have referred and
which tend to promote the prompt and efficient administration ofjustice, are available under the new Rules of Civil Procedure. Though
those rules abolish demurrers, pleas in bar, pleas in abatement,
and exceptions for insufficiency of a pleading,56 they do not eliminate
or impair appellate review upon certificate but do, in lieu of the
demurrer, provide the means of testing the sufficiency of a pleading
by certain motions which discharge the functions previously per-
formed by the demurrer. Those motions are dealt with by Rule 12,
which among others, contains these pertinent provisions which are
identical with the applicable provisions of the similarly numbered
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
"(b) How Presented. Every defense, in law or fact,
to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim,
counterclaim, crossclaim, or third party claim, shall be
asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is re-
quired, except that the following defenses may at the
option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction
over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of
process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7)
failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making
any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a
further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is
waived by being joined with one or more other defenses
or objections in a responsive pleading or motion. If a
pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse
party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, he
may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that
claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense
numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by
56 W. VA. R. Civ. P. 7 (c).
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the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary
judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all
parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all
material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
"(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. After
the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to
delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the
pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not ex-
cluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule
56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by
Rule 56.
"(f) Motion to Strike. Upon motion made by a party
before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive plead-
ing is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a
party within 20 days after the service of the pleading upon
him or upon the court's own initiative at any time, the
court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient
defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or
scandalous matter."
Concerning the meaning and the effect of the foregoing pro-
visions, the Original Note of the Reporters57 contains this helpful
comment, with most, but not all, of which I agree:
"4. It is somewhat difficult to draw analogies from
West Virginia procedure to Rules 12(b) (6), 12(c), and
56, since the demurrer to some extent now performs the
functions of all three of these motions. The three motions
overlap somewhat. None of the three motions may be
used to resolve genuine issues as to the material facts.
"A motion to dismiss, under Rule 12(b) (6), like a
demurrer under present procedure, would be appropriate
where it is obvious from the complaint that the plaintiff
has failed to state a claim, i.e., where the complaint has
omitted an essential element of the cause of action. The
motion to dismiss is the usual way to test the sufficiency
-5 144 W. Va. xxxvii - xxxviii, LuG R & SILvERmSr, Wr VmonL-
RuxLns (1960).
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of the complaint. Affirmative defenses should be asserted
under Rule 8(c), and not under Rule 12(b)(6), with
the exception of the defense of statute of limitations, at
least where time allegations in the complaint show a basis
for this defense.
"A motion under Rule 12(c) would be appropriate
where all the pleadings show plainly that the plaintiff does
not have a claim or that the defendant has no defense.
"If matters outside the pleadings are considered by
the court on either a motion to dismiss or for judgment on
the pleadings, Rule 56 will apply. A motion for summary
judgment, under Rule 56, may be made solely on the
pleadings, but is usually supported by affidavits and deposi-
tions. Then the test is whether there is a genuine issue
as to any material fact. If not, judgment will be given on
the issues of law presented.
"A summary judgment is a dismissal with prejudice,
whereas, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b), or a mo-
tion for judgment on the pleadings, under Rule 12(c), is
not a dismissal with prejudice. Note also that, under Rules
56(c) and (d), summary judgment may be granted in
interlocutory form or as to a part of the issues in the case,
whereas, this form of relief is not available under Rules
12(b)(6) and 12(c)."
During the period from July 1, 1960, when the new rules
became effective, and the adjournment of the last term of the
supreme court of appeals on July 6, 1962, there have been only
two cases before that court in which certification of questions in
cases governed by the new rules was considered or discussed.5"
In Petros v. Kellas, 9 decided October 24, 1961, a civil ac-
tion based on negligence, the circuit court, upon the pleadings
and matters outside the pleadings presented to and not excluded
by the court, rendered summary judgment under Rule 56 upon
motion of the defendants to dismiss for failure of the pleading
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. On appeal
58 Petros v. Kellas, 122 S.E.2d 177 (W. Va. 1961); Consolidation Coal
Co. v. Mineral Coal Co., 126 S.E.2d 194 (W. Va. 1962).
59 122 S.E.2d 177 (W. Va. 1961).
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the judgment was affirmed. The opinion, which I prepared, con-
tains these statements: "[A] judgment of dismissal of an action
under Rule 12(b) or a final judgment under Rule 56, rendered
by a trial court is not here reviewable upon certificate but can
be reviewed by this Court only upon appropriate appellate process."
This pronouncement is consistent with the holdings of the court
in cases decided before the adoption of the new rules that a judg-
ment dismissing the action after a demurrer to a declaration or
a bill of complaint has been sustained or a decree adjudicating
the principles of a cause is not reviewable upon certificate. Though
not necessary to the decision of the case, this language was in-
corporated in the opinion with the approval of the other members
of the court, to clarify the effect of rulings under the new rules
in connection with appellate review upon certificate, and to remove
any existing confusion concerning the form of an order sustaining
a motion to dismiss for failure of a complaint to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). As
under the former procedure an order sustaining a demurrer but
not dismissing the action was reviewable upon certificate but an
order sustaining a demurrer and dismissing the action was not so
reviewable, so under the new rules an order sustaining a motion
to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6) which dismisses the complaint but
does not dismiss the action is reviewable upon certificate but an
order which sustains a motion to dismiss the complaint and also
dismisses the action is not reviewable upon certificate but is re-
viewable only upon appropriate appellate process. Before the de-
cision in the Petros case, the court refused to docket several cases
presented on certificate because the order dismissed the action in-
stead of merely sustaining a motion to dismiss the pleading and
this situation prompted the insertion of the above quoted language
in the opinion of the court in that case. If the order had dis-
missed the pleading but not the action the question presented would
have been reviewable upon certificate.
In Consolidation Coal Co. v. Mineral Coal Co.,6" a civil action
prosecuted under the Rules of Civil Procedure, decided June 19,
1962, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from mining coal
by the strip or auger method in a designated disputed area in Bar-
bour County, and obtained a temporary injunction as prayed for
in its complaint. The defendant filed an answer in which it set up
60 126 S.E.2d 194 (W. Va. 1962).
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the defense that it was entitled to mine the coal in the controverted
area under certain leasehold provisions. The circuit court overruled
the motions of the defendant to dissolve the injunction and to dis-
miss the complaint because it failed to state a claim against the
defendant on which relief could be granted, held that the defense
alleged in the answer was insufficient because the instruments on
which it was based did not constitute a lease to mine the coal in
the disputed area, and on its own motion certified its ruling con-
cerning such defense to the supreme court of appeals. That court
reviewed the certified question, which of course was limited to the
sufficiency of the answer in alleging a valid defense and did not
relate to or involve any matter in connection with the injunction,
and reversed the ruling of the circuit court. It also found that the
allegations of the complaint and of the answer created a disputed
question of fact which could not be considered upon certificate and
remanded the case with directions that the circuit court determine
the factual question presented by the pleadings.
With reference to the test to determine whether an order
relating to process, a return of service or a pleading in cases governed
by the new rules is reviewable upon certificate under the statute,
the decisions of the federal courts which determine whether a
judgment rendered upon motions, under Rules 12(b)(6), 12(c)
and 56 is interlocutory and not appealable, or is appealable or final
in character, are helpful and applicable. Though there is some con-
flict, and there are some exceptions, those cases appear to hold
generally that an order under Rule 12(b), sustaining a motion to
dismiss a complaint but not dismissing the action, or an order
denying a motion to dismiss, or granting or denying a motion under
Rule 12(f) to strike from a pleading any insufficient defense, or
denying a motion under Rule 12(c) for judgment on the pleadings,
is interlocutory and not appealable, but that an order sustaining
a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) which also dismisses the
action or indicates that such dismissal was clearly intended by the
court or by the parties, or which sustains a motion for judgment
on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), or which sustains a motion for
summary judgment under Rule 56, is appealable and final. With
respect to certification under the statute, logically and in principle,
as a general rule, an order entered in cases under the new rules,
which the federal courts regard as merely interlocutory, would be
reviewable in this state upon certificate, whereas orders which such
[ Vol. 65
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courts regard as appealable or final would not be reviewable by
that method.
As illustrative of, and as support for, some of the foregoing
comments these few federal court decisions are mentioned briefly.
In Jung v. K & D Mining Company," decided April 28, 1958,
the Supreme Court of the United States held that an order of a
district court by which the motion of the plaintiff to vacate a previous
order dismissing the complaint and granting leave to file an amended
complaint was denied and the plaintiff was granted further leave to
amend the complaint, was not a final judgment but left the action
pending for further proceedings either by amendment of the com-
plaint or entry of a final judgment, and that, as occurs when there
is an order sustaining a demurrer with leave to amend, a subsequent
order of absolute dismissal after the expiration of the time allowed
for amendment is required to constitute a final disposition of the
case.
In Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. City of Seattje,62 the
ninth circuit court of appeals, the defendant moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground, among other grounds, that the complaint
failed to state a claim against the defendant upon which relief could
be granted. The district court sustained the motion and entered.
an order which provided "that the complaint of the plaintiff be,
and the same is hereby dismissed without prejudice to the right of
the plaintiff to file herein its amended complaint * * *. On appeal,
which was dismissed, the circuit court of appeals held that the fore-
going order was not a final order and was not appealable.
In Farbenfabriken Bayer, A. G., v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,63 the
defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings and for summary
judgment on the ground that under a Joint Resolution of Congress
the plaintiff, because of its enemy status, was disqualified to maintain
its action. The district court denied the motions and dismissed
the action without prejudice. On appeal the court held that the
plaintiff was entitled to maintain the action and reversed solely on
that ground." In the opinion the district court, in denying the
motions, said: "A judgment under either Rule 12(c) or Rule 56(b)
is essentially a judgment on the merits and may be entered only
61 356 U.S. 335 (1958).
62 281 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1960).
63 148 F. Supp. 733 (D. N.J. 1957).
64 251 F.2d 300 (3rd Cir.)cert. denied 356 U.S. 957 (1958).
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upon a conclusive determination of the issues of law." With that
pronouncement I am inclined to agree instead of with the comment
in the reporters' note that a motion for judgment on the pleadings
is not a dismissal with prejudice. It would appear that, as a general
rule, an order sustaining a motion for judgment on the pleadings
would be an appealable or final order and as such not certifiable,
although it might be that an order denying such motion or granting
such motion with leave to amend would be certifiable as a non-
appealable interlocutory judgment.
The suggestion has been made that the certification statute
should be amended to extend its scope and give it greater liberality.
Such suggestion though thought provoking is not, for me at least,
convincing and upon reflection I do not regard an amendment as
necessary or desirable. Any amendment would have to be made by
legislative enactment rather than by rule of court, for the reason
that enlargement of such appellate jurisdiction would be substantive
and not procedural in character and beyond the reach of any such
rule. Substantial extension of the jurisdiction now conferred by the
statute would most likely cause confusion and uncertainty as to the
function of the established usual appellate procedure for review
of the merits upon an appealable or final judgment, and tend to
encourage and approve piece-meal or partial determination of the
potentially decisive issues involved, and in that way prolong or delay
unduly the final decision of the proceeding. By proper use of the
motions for judgment upon the pleadings, or for summary judgment,
under the new rules, final decisions by the trial court may be ob-
tained with reasonable expedition; and when that stage of the litiga-
tion has been reached the present methods of appellate review
upon the merits are both adequate and effective to obviate any un-
reasonable expense or delay in the proper administration of justice.
The opinions which I have expressed in this paper are, of
course, merely my individual views. They are uttered not as those
of a member of the judiciary but, instead, as those of a member
of the bar. But whether they may be regarded as the views of
a judge or of a lawyer, I want to make it perfectly clear that I
reserve the unrestricted right to change my mind whenever and
wherever I may be required to consider officially any of the matters
dealt with in this paper. So my parting remark to you is that
perhaps you should not pay too much attention to anything I may
have told you.
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